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T

o someone holding a hammer, the cliché goes,
everything looks like a nail. A similar myopia
often afflicts legal minds as they approach
deep-seated problems in global health, as every crisis
is approached by first asking how it might be litigated
away. In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the limits of litigation as a tool for advancing
equitable access to health — indeed of its potential,
under some circumstances, to have a positively regressive impact.1 This very timely symposium offers us a
chance to reflect more deeply on the matter.
Our aim in this paper is to draw the lens back from a
narrow focus on litigation, to survey the broader landscape of global health law and governance. Many of
the most pressing health challenges facing the world
today are intertwined with the complex dynamics of
globalization, and require policy solutions that see
national and international institutions acting in concert, collaborating with the private sector and civil
society. The most glaring and urgent case in point —
which will serve as the focal point of our discussion
— concerns the precipitous rise of non-communicable
diseases (NCDs) worldwide.
Four NCDs — cardiovascular disease, cancer, respiratory disease and diabetes — account for 63% of
global deaths annually. The conventional wisdom,
which conceives of NCDs as a ‘First World’ problem,
is starkly belied by current data: of the 35 million people who die annually of NCDs, 80% are in low- and
middle-income countries. The death toll is projected
to rise by 17% over the next decade, unless meaningful steps are taken immediately. Recent meta-analysis
of available data shows a quintupling of diabetes in
rural areas of developing and middle-income countries.2 With the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, NCD
mortality now “exceeds that of communicable, maternal, perinatal, and nutritional conditions combined.”3
Conventional wisdom errs as well in supposing that
rising NCD rates are simply the byproduct of an aging
population: more than 50% of its global burden strikes
those under the age of 70.
Beyond the immediate suffering and death represented by these numbers, NCDs take a toll on development, in rising health care costs and lost productivity.
An authoritative study has estimated that the cumulative costs of NCDs will be at least $47 trillion from
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2010 through 2030, with mental illnesses accounting
for more than one-third of the cost. This is a low-end
estimate. Other economic models calculate the costs
at far higher levels still.4 These costs manifest themselves in downward spirals of poverty, for individuals
and families, as NCD sufferers find themselves unable
to work, and faced with ruinous medical expenses.

groups, there is no cohesive, self-identifying group lobbying for action on all NCDs. Looking back at social
mobilization against Big Tobacco, for example, one
finds that the movement was driven by a core group
of ardent volunteers — often relatives of the victims of
tobacco-related illness. Political momentum around
HIV/AIDS followed a similar dynamic. Rather than
unify around a comprehensive strategy on
NCDs, social movements have often splintered, raising consciousness about particuA problem as complex and consequential
lar diseases.
as NCDs requires engagement of
The multifactorial causation of NCDs
poses further challenges — not only for
national governments, the international
medicine and health policy, but also for
community, and an “all-of-society” approach
social mobilization. As explained below,
encompassing all key actors.
reducing the burden of NCDs will involve
experimentation with various complementary strategies, across multiple secThe moral tragedy lies in the fact that this is largely
tors. Whereas HIV/AIDS activists can rally around
preventable. The primary risk factors for NCDs are well
demands for access to anti-retroviral medicines, the
known, and could be reduced or eliminated, given the
policy demands of the anti-NCD movement will not
political and social will — through aggressive tobacco
fit neatly on a placard.
control, reduced air pollution, healthier diets, increased
One might hope that litigation would serve as a
physical activity, and reduced alcohol consumption.
catalyst for faltering social movements. Such was the
Together, these variables account for 80% of heart discase, for example, with the anti-tobacco movement in
ease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes, and 40% of cancers.5
the U.S., as litigation led to the disclosure of damning
A problem as complex and consequential as NCDs
industry documents, prompting public outrage and
requires engagement of national governments, the
swift government action. A similar trajectory seems
international community, and an “all-of-society”
unlikely in the case of NCDs, in part because no single
approach encompassing all key actors. Below we disindustry is to blame — the problems are manifold, as
cuss innovative governance strategies at the national
are the solutions. Typically, where NCDs give rise to
and international levels for addressing the problem
litigation, claimants are seeking access to expensive
of NCDs, spanning across various sectors (e.g., trade,
medical therapies, such as cancer treatments. Rare are
agriculture, transportation, and the environment) and
the cases where litigation is used to demand impleengaging diverse stakeholders (e.g., multilateral orgamentation of broad preventative strategies — though
nizations, states, civil society, philanthropic groups, and
there have been encouraging developments around
industry). But before setting out in search of solutions,
the issue of second-hand tobacco smoke.6
it is worth trying to understand the failings to date.
Plainly, the focus in addressing NCDs must be largely
on prevention, as opposed to pharmacomedical treat1. The Quiet Growth of an Epidemic
ment after the fact. But prevention strategies aimed
The past half-century has seen momentous accomat improved health for the next generation may lack
plishments in global health: the triumph of polio
the political urgency of treatment strategies that save
vaccination, the eradication of smallpox, and unanidentifiable lives today. Many of the strategies outlined
ticipated successes in containing the HIV/AIDS epibelow will pay out their dividends over decades. From
demic. On the face of it, the challenge of NCDs would
the vantage point of today, the beneficiaries are largely
appear comparatively manageable — as indicated, the
statistical ‘people’ — e.g., the cohort of adults entering
risk factors are well understood, and there are prommiddle age, decades from now, experiencing reduced
ising strategies available to mitigate them. Why then
rates of adult-onset diabetes, thanks in part to public
has the problem been allowed to spiral out of control?
health interventions on diet and physical activity.
Moreover, prevention strategies often have a whiff of
Challenges in Social Mobilization around NCDs
paternalism, and this can be a distinct political liabilA key factor has been the lack of social mobilization,
ity. New York City’s Mayor recently unveiled plans to
to date, pressing for urgent action. Though particulimit the serving size of sugary soft dinks sold in movie
lar NCDs have heightened prevalence among specific
theatres and convenience stores, immediately earning
global health and the law • spring 2013
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himself the nickname ‘Nanny Bloomberg.’ Similarly,
the anti-tobacco movement stalled for decades, as it
was believed that the decision to smoke — by then
known to be a life or death decision — was a matter
of personal choice, not of public concern. It was only
when the dangers of second-hand smoke came to light
that the social movement gained momentum.
We mention these concerns about paternalism
only to signal the drag they may have on social movements and, in turn, government action; in substance
the concern is, quite frankly, often overblown. Like
second-hand smoke, NCDs have an enormous impact
on innocent third parties — among other things, by

power worldwide. We mentioned some of these myths
already: e.g., the view that NCDs affect only the elderly
and the affluent; that they are the product of personal
choice and therefore beyond the proper reach of government; and the fatalistic assumption that the problem is insolubly complex.
Moreover, even when NCDs are recognized as a
problem, they are often placed below infectious diseases in decision makers’ list of priorities. At the level
of global institutions, this is partly a reflection of historical roles: the World Health Organization (WHO),
and its institutional precursors in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, were primarily focused on the

The lack of social mobilization has allowed various myths about NCDs
to go unchallenged in the halls of power worldwide. We mentioned some
of these myths already: e.g., the view that NCDs affect only the elderly and
the affluent; that they are the product of personal choice and therefore
beyond the proper reach of government; and the fatalistic assumption
that the problem is insolubly complex.
using up scarce health care resources, increasingly in
developing countries still burdened with deadly communicable diseases (the so-called ‘double-burden’).
Just as there is a valid public interest in assuring that
citizens are educated and thereby able to contribute to
the common good, so too there is a valid public interest in the prevention of chronic maladies.
Moreover, the anti-paternalism objection rests on
a perverse assumption — namely, that the status quo,
with its rising NCD rates, is itself the product of individual choices, freely made.7 The reality of course is
that myriad collective decisions — made by governments and private interests — shape the menu of
options available to individuals, determining the price
and availability of nutritious foods, the accessibility of
places to exercise, ways to commute to and from work,
and so on. There is no avoiding government influence over risk behaviors. The question is only whether
that influence will advance or detract from the ability to lead a healthy lifestyle. Calls for a laissez-faire
approach are especially galling, given it is the poor
who will bear the brunt of government inaction — as
they may lack the financial means and leisure time
needed to prepare healthy foods, exercise, have regular checkups, and so on.
Misunderstanding among Key Decision Makers
The lack of social mobilization has allowed various
myths about NCDs to go unchallenged in the halls of
18

containment of infectious diseases. Having specialized in infectious diseases for decades, WHO has
been reticent in pressing an expanded agenda on
the broader determinants of health. If the aim is to
promote long and healthy lives, WHO’s prioritization is quite misguided, as there is a direct interplay
between infectious diseases and NCDs. Many infectious agents are known to cause cancer (e.g., HPV
and cervical cancer); many of the risk factors for
NCDs also exacerbate infectious diseases (e.g., smoking increases the risk of death from tuberculosis);
and infectious disease therapies increase the risk of
NCDs (e.g., antiretroviral regimens can increase the
risk of heart disease in HIV patients). A recent study
found that 1 in 6 cancers worldwide are caused by
treatable or preventable infections. Infection-related
cancers are much more prevalent in the developing
world than the developed (23% of cancers versus 7%,
respectively) — owing to lack of vaccination and antimicrobial treatments, etc.8
Lastly, decision makers often assume that their pursuit of economic development will bring improved
health as a byproduct. That assumption is tenuous in
the case of NCDs, which may in fact be exacerbated by
development, as urbanization leads to increased reliance on cars, less green space for recreation, and rising
incomes lead to increased consumption of tobacco,
alcohol, and calorie laden foods. Globalization of trade
and investment — a favored strategy for economic
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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development — facilitates the supply and marketing
of unhealthy consumer goods.
The situation is dire but not hopeless. Given the
political will, there is much that national governments
can do to stem the tide on NCDs. As we will explore
in section 2, the options range from soft interventions
such as improved food labeling to more direct forms
of regulation (e.g., banning trans fats). Yet efforts
to respond to this crisis are doomed to fail without
international cooperation. Many of the risk factors
associated with NCDs are, in a very real sense, communicable. They are communicated from wealthy
nations to developing nations, facilitated by global
trade agreements, through the marketing and export
of cigarettes, alcohol, and unhealthy processed foods.
Billions of people worldwide have seen their physical,
cultural, and nutritional landscape drastically changed
in recent decades, by forces of globalization that lie
mostly beyond their control. In section 3, we explore
how global governance strategies might respond as a
force for health.
Though we will focus largely on public institutions, one must recognize the essential role of the
private sector in the search for sustainable solutions
to the NCD epidemic. While the anti-tobacco movement rightly demands that Big Tobacco be denied
any role in public health initiatives, the food industry will need to be engaged, on an ongoing basis,
in the battle against NCDs. This need for ongoing
food industry engagement, as part of lasting solution, remains a daunting challenge: experience with
tobacco suggests that entrenched industries will fight
reforms tooth-and-nail. In section 4, we explore the
promise and perils of multisectoral solutions to the
NCD crisis.

2. Domestic Strategies for Addressing NCDs
National governments — and their counterparts at
the state and local level — will of necessity be the
primary actors in the battle against NCDs, as they
alone possess the sovereign authority to implement
needed legal and regulatory measures. Indeed, under
international human rights law, domestic governments are obligated to promote the highest attainable
standard of health among their population, within
the resources at their disposal. What does this obligation require, concretely, by way of action on NCDs?
There is no one-size-fits-all governance solution, as
interventions must be tailored to the particular needs
of a population and optimized within resource constraints. In what follows, though, we survey some
key interventions, ranging from simple surveillance
of NCD rates to more direct, ‘command and control’
regulation.9
global health and the law • spring 2013

Monitoring Rates of NCDs
While infectious disease surveillance is well accepted,
surveillance of chronic diseases remains, in some circles, controversial.10 For example, New York city has
drawn controversy with its diabetes surveillance program, which includes mandatory laboratory reporting of glycated hemoglobin, directives for physicians
in managing patients with poor glycemic control, and
advice to patients about diabetes management. Civil
libertarians and some physicians vehemently oppose
surveillance, arguing it interferes with patient privacy,
clinical freedom, and the doctor-patient relationship.
Patients can opt out of receiving health department
advice, but not the reporting requirement. However, opting out is a complex procedure, which itself
requires limited information disclosure.11
Monitoring of NCD rates is essential if governments
are to be held accountable for health outcomes among
their populations. A purely ‘opt-in’ scheme for surveillance would run the risk of selection bias: if, for
example, a given minority group is prone to opt-out,
their rising NCD rates may go unnoticed. Moreover,
as indicated, there is good reason to question the traditional outlook — seemingly at play in opposition to
surveillance programs — which sees infectious diseases as a proper concern of public health officials, but
non-communicable diseases as falling within the privity of patient/doctor relationships.
Full Disclosure of the Health Effects
of Consumer Goods
Consumers often make poor product choices because
they lack clear, comprehensible information. Consider
the bewildering way in which much food is marketed:
“low fat” can mask for high sugar and sodium, “low
sodium” can mask for high calorie; “zero trans fats”
can mask for high saturated fats; and so forth.
To remedy this obfuscation, governments can compel industry to disclose the truth about their products,
by requiring clearer food package labeling, health
warnings on cigarettes and alcohol, and nutritional
information on restaurant menus. The United Kingdom Food Standards Agency developed a voluntary
system that is visible and simple to follow. Known as a
“traffic light” system, companies must label foods with
prominent green, yellow, or red lights for each of the
major nutritional groups — whole grains, saturated
fat, sodium, and sugar.12 Not only does this clearly
inform the lay public, but it also provides an incentive
for food manufacturers to develop healthier products,
to avoid the stigma of four prominent red lights on
their packaging. Uniform labeling across brands may
in turn promote healthy competition — in the most
literal sense. Happily, clear and comprehensible food
19

S Y MPO SIUM

labeling is entirely consonant with concerns for personal autonomy, as it merely enables individuals to
make informed choices.
Regulation of Advertisements
Many governments have already limited advertising
of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, to forbid the targeting of children and adolescents (though in virtually
every country, more could be done, for example, on
plain packaging of cigarettes). The notable exception
is the food industry, which alone spends more than $11
billion annually to market its products in the United
States alone. The bulk of industry spending is to promote unhealthy foods, such as sweetened beverages,
sugary cereals, candy, and highly processed foods with
added sugar, fats, and sodium.13 Advertising is ubiquitous, spanning television, radio, and the print media to
the Internet and “advergames,” where food is used as
a lure in fun video games.14 The industry has adopted
ineffectual voluntary self-regulatory measures.15
In 1980, Québec, Canada banned fast food advertisements targeting children, which has reduced
annual spending on fast foods by an estimated $88
million. The province now boasts the country’s lowest childhood obesity rate. Moreover, healthier eating
habits, once ingrained in childhood, are carried into
adult life.16
Regulating the content of advertising is contentious, potentially implicating constitutional rights to
commercial free speech. Certainly the public supports
regulation of misleading messages directed toward
young people, yet there is bound to be disagreement
over what messages are misleading versus simply
alluring. Despite these concerns, regulation of advertising to children may be politically acceptable given
the potential for manipulation of vulnerable youth
and the state’s responsibility to protect minors.
Setting Incentives and Disincentives
Government’s main method of disincentivizing the
purchase of certain products is to levy taxes on them.
So-called ‘fat-taxes’ have been proposed as a proactive
response to a food industry and consumer culture that
increasingly promotes unhealthy foods as the cheapest, tastiest, and most readily accessible option. 17
The World Health Organization has endorsed this
strategy.18
As expected, critics allege that fat taxes are paternalistic, and also regressive, as poor people are the
primary consumers of high-fat foods. Again, it is
instructive to contrast this to the regulation of cigarettes, where there is greater support for state intervention. One rarely hears it argued that cigarette taxes
are paternalistic — not in serious debate, at least —
20

as it is widely acknowledged that they serve merely
to internalize the full social costs of smoking. On the
‘regressive’ charge, notice that cigarette taxes are often
praised as having a progressive health impact, precisely because the deterrent effect becomes stronger
as one moves down the income scale.19 In the case of
cigarettes there are valid concerns that heavy taxation
may lead to smuggling and black market sales, particularly in the developing world;20 the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, discussed below, is meant
partly to address this problem.21
Unlike cigarettes — for which cessation is the best
option — government can take steps to incentivize the
production, sale and consumption of healthier foods,
for example, by subsidizing fresh fruits and vegetables
at the level of the farm or retailer. (In some leading
food producing states, a first step would be to cease
the subsidization of unhealthy foods, such as high
fructose corn syrup or cane sugar).
Furthermore, government, employers, and others
could offer incentives for physical activity and exercise: subsidies for taking public transportation, joining fitness clubs, and participating in organized sporting activities. Tax policy can be used, for example, to
provide individuals a “flexible spending account” of
tax-exempt funds for physical activities or exercise,
such as riding a bicycle to work or school.
Direct Regulation
A more aggressive, and controversial, approach to
regulation would consist of an outright ban on foods
or ingredients deemed to be especially injurious to
health. A growing body of scientific evidence links
trans fatty acids to coronary heart disease. The Institute of Medicine concluded that trans fats provide
no benefit to human health, and that there is no safe
level of trans fat consumption.22 In 2003, Denmark
became the first country to set an upper limit on the
percentage of industrially produced trans fat in foods.
New York City later restricted the sale of products
containing artificial trans fat in all restaurants. As of
July 1, 2007, restaurants were prohibited from preparing recipes that contain more than 0.5 g of trans
fat per serving.23 The Food and Drug Administration,
moreover, requires trans fat levels to appear on food
labels. Notice, however, that even 0.5 g of trans fat per
serving is unhealthy, especially if a consumer is eating
multiple servings during the course of a day. Recent
studies have shown the New York ban to be a clear
success — restaurants have lowered trans fat levels
without raising prices or substituting a commensurate
rise in saturated fats.24
Incremental forms of direct regulation have been
proposed as ‘end game’ strategies in the war against
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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tobacco. Some propose gradually reducing the nicotine content of cigarettes, eventually dropping below
the threshold levels of addiction.25 Others propose a
‘sinking lid’ on the supply of cigarettes available for
commercial sale,26 or grandfathering schemes that peg
the age of sale to a calendar year — e.g., permanently
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to anyone born after
January 1, 2000.27
Performance-Based Regulation
There is a concern that direct ‘command and control’
methods of regulation may have unforeseen negative

community. In this way, public health goals are closely
aligned with goals of the environmental movement.
Finally, governments could require that planning
for new developments include health impact assessments. Consultation with communities and public
health evaluations could be required as a pre-condition of initiating significant building projects.
This survey of regulatory options available to
domestic governments is necessarily cursory. Individual countries and communities will need to choose
among these and other options, developing strategies
that address their needs. What we mean to impress

Individual choices are not made in isolation, but reflect in important ways
the environment in which people live. The built environment may facilitate
or inhibit a healthy lifestyle. Government’s job is to make health the easier,
or default, choice rather than, at present, the much more difficult choice.
Government can work to help people stay healthy by enacting zoning and
land-use laws that create healthier places for its residents to live.
consequences; the approach puts great stock in government’s ability to engineer healthy lifestyles. An
alternative approach, which gets around this problem,
is for government to set a measurable outcome, which
companies must reach within a certain period of time,
or face penalty.28 It is then left to relevant food companies to figure out a way to meet these targets at pain
of penalty if they fail. This approach harnesses the
private sector’s capacity for innovation as an engine of
public health.
Optimize the Built Environment for Health
Individual choices are not made in isolation, but reflect
in important ways the environment in which people
live. The built environment may facilitate or inhibit a
healthy lifestyle. Government’s job is to make health
the easier, or default, choice rather than, at present,
the much more difficult choice. Government can work
to help people stay healthy by enacting zoning and
land-use laws that create healthier places for its residents to live. By designing green spaces, playgrounds,
sidewalks, and paths for easy walking, hiking, and biking, local government can do a great deal to improve
the health of the population.
Government can also take steps to limit or discourage motor vehicles in city centers, to encourage
pedestrian traffic and make the air cleaner for walkers
and bicyclists. Thus, supporting mass transit systems
and ensuring safe routes for people to walk to school,
work, and shops are an essential part of a healthy
global health and the law • spring 2013

is simply the breadth of options available to governments — hopefully giving readers some sense, by
implication, of the limited role for courts.
We next explore how governance structures at the
international level could support national governments in their efforts to combat NCDs. The question links to an innovative global civil society project
recently launched, pressing for a Framework Convention on Global Health.

3. Marshaling a Global Response
For a time, rising NCD rates were met with apathy
from the global community. There is no global fund
for chronic diseases, no major foundation championing the cause, little mention by the G8 or G20, and
the issue is not even targeted in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. As discussed, the preeminent global health institution, WHO, has historically
focused its attention and resources on infectious diseases — though that is changing, as we will explain.
The complexity of NCDs presents a challenge in
forging a unified and comprehensive global response.
NCDs comprise a basket of various diseases, implicating risk factors that span multiple sectors of economies and societies. Furthermore, viable solutions will
necessarily implicate not only public actors but also
a host of private actors, including private companies,
civil society, the media, and academia. We begin by
explaining why a global response is needed, notwithstanding these formidable challenges.
21
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Why a Global Response Is Urgently Needed
Processes of globalization have led to a harmonization of behaviors — exacerbating many of the risk
factors for NCDs in the process.29 Thus, for example,
the industrialization of food manufacture, along with
the globalization of trade in food, has led to the displacement of traditional diets, in favor of a dietary
convergence around processed, high-sugar, high-salt,
high-fat foods (HSSF foods).30 The health effects are
exacerbated by urbanization, often linked to increased
reliance on cars, polluted air, and fewer options for
physical exercise.
Globalization also shapes the power dynamics in
health politics, as large multinationals exert their
influence, resisting change at every turn. Over the
past quarter century, transnational tobacco companies have aggressively exploited growth opportunities
in developing countries.31 Internet commerce, online
marketing and the illicit trade in tobacco products
have greatly complicated attempts to regulate the supply and marketing of these products.32 A strong correlation has been found between free trade liberalization and increased consumption of tobacco.33
After tobacco use, alcohol consumption is the
world’s third-largest risk factor for health burden; in
middle-income countries, which constitute almost
half of the world’s population, it in fact poses the
greatest risk.34 The alcohol industry is as globalized as
the tobacco industry — creating comparable problems
for regulation at the national level.35 The industry also
jealously defends its right to market its products, even
portraying them as sexy, adventurous, and sporty.
The food industry is more complex given that food
is part of life’s necessities. But that industry too has
ubiquitously marketed foods that are highly processed, fat laden, sweetened, and full of sodium.
Many lower income countries lack the resources
needed to contain the risk factors associated with
NCDs.36 Major multinationals promoting cigarettes,
alcohol, and unhealthy foods may have resources at
their disposal that far surpass the GDP of some of
these countries. A global response is needed to ensure
adequate resources, and to ensure that all countries
have access to the necessary expertise.
The Political Declaration on NCDs
In recent years, WHO has begun to take initiative on
the NCD pandemic, even if very late and too little.
Arguably the most significant step was the adoption, in
2003, of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC),37 which provides a blueprint for national
tobacco control policies, tying these to an evolving
scheme of international protocols (e.g. controlling
sales to minors, tobacco smuggling, and packaging
22

guidelines). The FCTC was groundbreaking, being the
first treaty negotiated under the auspices of the WHO.
It is also one of the most widely embraced treaties in
the history of the UN, having now 174 signatories.
Other WHO initiatives — which due to space constraints we can only mention here — include the
Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of
Noncommunicable Diseases (2000), the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (2008); the
Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol (2010), and the formation of a Global Noncommunicable Disease Network (NCDnet).38 The WHO is
also formally linked to the Global Alliance for the Prevention of Obesity and Related Chronic Diseases — a
grouping a NGOs working to coordinate strategies on
diet and excercise.39
These various WHO initiatives, while important,
did not bring the issue of NCDs to the same high profile as, for example, the global initiative around HIV/
AIDS. The global health community lobbied successfully for a High-level Meeting (HLM) of the UN
General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of
NCDs, which was held in September 2011. Hopes
were understandably high: prior to this, there had
only been one such meeting with a health focus – a
momentous 2001 meeting on AIDS, which galvanized
social and political action on that pandemic.
The HLM on NCDs resulted in the unanimous
adoption of a Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases — a
65-point document, cataloguing many facets of the
problem, and calling for a ‘whole-of-government’
and ‘whole-of-society’ response.40 Broadly speaking, the Declaration calls for a range of preventative
measures, strengthening national health systems to
ensure early detection and treatment of NCDs; international cooperation on NCDs; research and development; and monitoring and evaluation of progress on
the issue.
The Declaration, however, is short on specifics for
implementation, calling on member states to develop
their own national action plans by 2013, guided by
voluntary targets subsequently issued by the WHO
in 2012. In May of 2012, the World Health Assembly — the voting body of WHO — gaveled through a
resolution setting a global target of a 25% reduction
in premature mortality from NCDs by 2025 (conveniently yielding a catchy slogan — “25 by 25”). Setting very broad and distant targets in this way is the
easy part, of course, as experience with climate change
has shown; the hard part is establishing specific,
near term targets, monitoring progress against clear
benchmarks, and ensuring compliance. At the time
of writing, member states were slated to meet by the
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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end of October 2012 to establish further targets and a
monitoring framework.
We emphasize that these are all voluntary, nonbinding targets — a feature which has been the focus
of many critiques of the Declaration. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, for
example, promptly complained of a missed opportunity for firm action to end farm subsidies for nonnutritious foods, or to curtail the marketing of junk
food to children worldwide.41 Similar complaints have
issued from advocacy groups working on other NCD
risk factors. What was conspicuously absent from
the Political Declaration were effective measures for
global governance — either “soft” or “hard” — with the
power to steer global health action on NCDs.
It is unfortunate that this important groundwork
for global action on NCDs was laid during a severe
economic downturn. Though the Declaration recognizes the need for resources, it makes no commitments to provide them — instead calling on Member
States to investigate funding options, within their
budget allocations, and through ‘innovating financing
mechanisms.’ The Declaration speaks as well of the
importance of North-South cooperation, but takes no
steps to set that in motion.
Ambitious, long-term targets and catchy slogans
can play an important role in consciousness raising —
the campaign to eradicate smallpox worked to a target
date, and more recently the ‘3 by 5’ slogan (three million people on antiretroviral therapy by 2005) was an
inspiring benchmark for the HIV/AIDS movement.
However, the ‘25 by 25’ target is ambitious even by
comparison to those lofty campaigns, and there is no
agreement on intermediary benchmarks.
The challenge grows more daunting by the day, as
key risk factors of smoking, alcohol, unhealthy diet,
and insufficient physical exercise are on the rise, as is
the primary risk factor — aging. Moreover, there are
limits on what can be achieved through preventative
measures in the space of 13 years. A good portion of
the target 25% reduction will need to be achieved
through treatment rather than prevention — requiring dramatic increases in funding, full engagement
of pharmaceutical companies, low cost and effective
diagnostics, and buy-in from ministries of finance,
trade, customs, and transportations. In contrast, curbing the NCD pandemic in the long run will require
determined action to prevent the primary behavioral
risk factors.
The Political Declaration will hopefully not be the
last global pronouncement on the matter. Other ambitious ideas have been tabled for global health governance, some building on the framework convention
model employed for tobacco control. For example,
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there is a growing campaign afoot for a Framework
Convention on Global Health (FCGH), building on
the precedent of the historic FCTC. The Joint Action
and Learning Initiative on National and Global
Responsibilities for Health (www.jalihealth.org) is
leading this campaign, which aims to broadly reshape
global governance for health — establishing binding
national and international commitments on health,
addressing many of the key risk factors for NCDs.42
Borrowing from the FCTC or FCGH, advocates have
called for a framework convention on alcohol and on
obesity itself.
Challenges to a Global Response
The WHO, unlike any other global-health body, can
create legally binding conventions, requiring a twothirds majority vote by member states. However, the
WHO has generally preferred to issue non-binding
recommendations, guidelines, and standards. Lack of
political will has often stood in the way. An example is
the attempt to adopt a binding regulation on the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, dating back to the
1970s, which failed thanks to opposition from some
developed countries.43
The WHO’s reluctance to use hard legal instruments
has been lamented by some.44 Others argue that the
direct costs associated with drafting, ratification, and
enforcement of international laws — together with
disadvantages of prioritizing process over outcomes,
consensus over diversity, generality over specificity,
states over non-state actors, and lawyers over health
researchers — make the soft law approach a better
option.45
Most importantly, for any approach that is adopted
there must be mechanisms to ensure compliance. This
is true for both hard and soft law. The risks here are
evidenced with the FCTC: despite this legally binding
instrument, tobacco use is increasing in many poor
countries, and remains the second-largest cause of
disease risk in middle-income countries.46

3. Multisectoral Approaches:
Their Promise and Pitfalls
Our discussion to this point has advocated an ‘all-ofgovernment’ approach, encompassing a range of policy initiatives that fall outside the health portfolio as
traditionally conceived — implicating trade, agriculture, urban planning, schools, the environment, etc.
We then explained that the support and collaboration
of global institutions was needed, to ensure that health
is prioritized amidst global forces pursuing trade and
economic development. In this final section, we look
beyond the role of national and international public
institutions, to explore the role of private companies,
23

S Y MPO SIUM

civil society, the media, and academia, in an ‘all-ofsociety’ effort to reverse NCD rates.

multinationals, with deep pockets and demonstrated
lobbying savvy. As we’ve seen, the counterbalancing forces of social mobilization on this issue have, to
Engaging Private Industry
date, been fragmented and ineffectual — due in part to
One can scarcely overstate the power that multinationinherent features of the NCD crisis (e.g., the diversity
als wield over the risk factors associated with NCDs,
and complexity of ailments captured by this umbrella
from the labeling and nutritional content of foods on
term).
grocery store shelves and in restaurants, to the global
Problems akin to regulatory capture can arise
marketing of sugary drinks, alcoholic beverages, and
whether private industry is regulated under a comcigarettes. If the pandemic is to be dealt with, private
mand-and-control model, or instead engaged in pubindustry must play some role. It can be compellingly
lic-private partnerships. As others have noted, the oftargued that the tobacco industry has no role to play
touted model of ‘public-private partnerships’ is poorly
defined and multiply ambiguous. In some
instances, the ostensible ‘partners’ are
tied only financially, with the private secThere will often be no path of ‘enlightened
tor funding government initiatives (or
self-interest’ leading major multinationals to
vice versa). In other cases, partnerships
voluntarily sell healthier goods. The reality, as
merely provide a forum for ‘discussion’
one author puts it, “is that ‘good’ foods are bad between public and private sectors, with
no money changing hands, and no shared
commodities with low profit margins while
governance responsibilities. In other
‘bad’ foods are good commodities.”
cases still, partnerships involve more formal governance structures, with voting
boards drawn from public and private
as a partner in public health, as that industry will best
sectors.47 And these partnerships can delay or even
contribute to public health by disappearing. The same
block what may be truly needed, which is direct regcannot be said, though, of the food industry — nor,
ulation. One cannot assume that these partnerships
realistically, of the alcohol industry.
are structured to serve the public interest; they must
The question is not so much whether private indusbe carefully scrutinized to guard against conflicts of
try will be engaged, but how. And public health ageninterest.
There will often be no path of ‘enlightened selfcies — both domestic and global — must adopt clear
interest’ leading major multinationals to voluntarily
conflict of interest rules that prevent industry from
sell healthier goods. The reality, as one author puts
having preferential access to policymaking or undue
it, “is that ‘good’ foods are bad commodities with low
influence. Various arrangements are possible, ranging
profit margins while ‘bad’ foods are good commodifrom command-and-control approaches to public/
ties.”48 The public health community must brace itself
private partnerships, through to voluntary self-regufor a long, uphill battle on this issue, and be very wary
lation. No prescription can be issued in the abstract; a
of ‘win-win’ solutions touted by industry. Ultimately,
dynamic approach is needed, driven by the pursuit of
it must become unacceptable for industry to aggresthe public’s health. We offer some pathways for consively market unhealthy products, enticing consumstructive industry engagement.
ers to eat food or drink beverages that are distinctly
There are well-known risks involved in attempting
unhealthy.
to regulate well-entrenched private industries. Among
these is the risk of regulatory ‘capture,’ whereby public
Civil Society Engagement
agencies fall under the sway of industries under their
In its political dynamics, the issue of NCDs has a
charge. The theory here, roughly stated, is that subforeboding similarity to climate change: both involve
jects of regulation have a high-stakes interest in influurgent global challenges, requiring major investments
encing their regulators, and will focus their energies
of financial resources and political capital, whose diviand resources to sway policy in a favorable direction.
dends will pay out long after the next election cycle.
Even if raw self-interest does not hold sway, regulators
Under these circumstances there is a strong tempand industry work so closely with one another that
tation for those in positions of power — in governthey can get too cozy and comfortable. On the face of
ment and private industry — to leave the problem for
it, the risk of regulatory capture seems especially acute
another day. It therefore falls to civil society to be vocal
in efforts to address NCD risk factors. The food, alcoand relentless on this issue, pressing governments to
hol, and cigarette industries are dominated by huge
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set out detailed strategies, with near-term benchmarks and monitoring requirements.
Here too, one must demand transparency from civil
society groups, and be watchful for potential conflicts
of interest. As with every dirty trick in health politics,
this one has been performed par excellence by the
tobacco industry, which for decades disseminated
misinformation about the health risks and addictiveness of cigarettes, through front groups masquerading
as independent think tanks.49
Broader consciousness-raising about NCDs will be
vital as well — pitched at the general public qua citizens and consumers. In the current climate of worldwide government austerity, it will no doubt be argued
that the problem is too costly to address now; this attitude dovetails ideologically with the view that NCD
prevention is a matter of personal rather than public
responsibility. Public initiatives to address the tobacco
and HIV/AIDS epidemics were stalled for a time, with
enormous human costs, thanks to misguided beliefs
along these same lines. The point needs to be driven
home relentlessly that government can respond effectively to the NCD crisis, and that failure to do so will
be many times more costly.
Having secured a place for NCDs on the public
agenda, civil society will then have an ongoing role
to play, lending its expertise to the development and
selection of evidence-based policy responses.50 As the
survey of policy options above suggests, expert input
from very diverse sources will be required (e.g., experts
in urban planning, agriculture policy, and information
sciences).
Through all of this, global cooperation among civil
society groups will be essential. The coming years will
hopefully see experimentation with novel strategies to
reverse NCD rates, offering an opportunity for countries to learn from one another’s successes and failures. Civil society groups will have an important role
to play in this learning process, as impartial observers
committed to advancing public health.

Why the Crushing and Unequal Burden
of NCDs Is Unacceptable
It seems paradoxical, on its face: the major health
challenges of our time desperately call out for national
and global action on an unprecedented scale; yet the
trend in many countries is toward litigation of health
rights, often on an individualized basis. On reflection, though, it appears that these two trends may be
mutually supporting. Our failure to take meaningful,
collective action to reverse rising NCD rates has left
health systems worldwide to cope with the burden. As
those systems reach their resource capacity, there is no
choice but to ration care. The end result: worldwide,
global health and the law • spring 2013

vast numbers of very sick people coping with chronic
illnesses, scrabbling for expensive treatments; those
who can appeal to the courts as a last resort.
The NCD crisis is largely of our own making —
reflecting individual and societal choices — and can
be reversed only through concerted national and
global effort. The past century has seen inspiring
achievements in public health, though perhaps none
has required such a broad, multi-sectoral response as
reversing the dominant trend of ever increasing obesity, sedentary lifestyles, and self-destructive behavior
through tobacco use and excessive consumption of
alcoholic beverages.
For those who argue that all this suffering and economic toll is only a matter of personal choice, family
responsibility, and the free market, we insist that the
status quo is simply unacceptable. Make health the
easier, default, option, rather than being agonizingly
difficult.51 Reveal the suffering of people, families,
and whole societies caused by the crushing burden of
NCDs. And refuse to accept the unconscionable health
inequalities between the rich and poor — both within
and among nations.
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